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Abstract
We explain often anomalous results of capital structure tests by infusing tradeoff
theory with real options. Of course one can explain almost everything using a
soft qualitative theory. This paper's addition is to use a quantitative approach to
generate tradeoff theory predictions for firms with valuable real options. We are
able to explain many of the results of Rajan and Zingales (1995), Welch (2004),
and Flannery and Rangan (2006).
Thesis Supervisor: Stewart C. Myers
Title: Robert C. Merton (1970) Professor of Financial Economics
2
Acknowledgements
I am extremely grateful to Stewart Myers, Wei Dou, and Bengt Holmstrom
for their comments throughout numerous drafts. This paper stems from Research
Assistantship work that Wei Dou and I performed for Stewart Myers and James A.
Read concerning their working paper "Real Options, Taxes and financial Lever-
age."
3
Contents
1 Introduction 6
2 Related Literature 7
2.1 Myers and Read (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Tserlukevich (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Barclay et al. (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3 Capital Structure Tests 11
3.1 Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2 Rajan and Zingales (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3 W elch (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.4 Flannery and Rangan (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4 Formulation of Model 16
5 Example 19
6 Generating Sample of Firms and Capital Structure 36
6.1 How different variables depend on the aggregate shocks . . . . . . 48
6.2 Constant Volatility of equity, and volatility for simulations . . . . 49
6.3 Effect of Time on Firm Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
6.4 Alternate Ways to Remove Firms from Sample . . . . . . . . . . 54
7 Results of Regressions 64
4
7.1 Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
7.1.1 Alternative Firm Removal Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . 65
7.2 Rajan and Zingales (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
7.2.1 Alternative Firm Removal Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . 72
7.3 Welch (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
7.3.1 Welch (2004) using Mature vs Non-Mature Companies . . 86
7.4 Flannery and Rangan (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
7.4.1 Alternate Firm Removal Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
8 Target Adjustment Effect on Tests 102
8.1 Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
8.2 Rajan and Zingales (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
8.3 W elch(2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
8.4 Flannery and Rangan (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
9 Conclusion 119
5
1 Introduction
The more debt a firm has, the more distress and potential bankruptcy costs the firm
carries. On the other hand, the more debt a firm has, the more the tax advantages
of debt the firm enjoys. (For a further discussion on the benefits and costs of
debt, see the survey paper Graham and Leary (2011).) The tradeoff theory says
that these are the main issues the firm faces in determining its capital structure
each period. So if a firm were to only have fixed assets, such as a factory, then it
would have a constant proportion of the value of the firm as debt and a constant
proportion of the value of the firm as equity.
However, if the firm has growth options, then the optimal capital structure
would change. Consider a firm which has a widget factory next to an open tract
of land. The firm has the option to build another widget factory on the open tract
of land. So if the price of widgets goes above a cutoff threshold, then the firm will
build the factory. So if the factory manager increases debt at t=0, goes bankrupt
at t=l, and then the price of widgets increases at t=2, he will have lost the real
growth option. Hence he will decrease debt at t=0 relative to the case where there
is no empty tract of land.
The tests of capital structure do not account for growth options, which can
have a substantial effect on a firm's capital structure. Thus if the tradeoff model
really holds, the capital structure tests can give answers that seem to reject the
trade off theory in favor of another model.
We simulate the dynamic evolution of 100 firms which follow the tradeoff
6
theory, adjusted for real growth options as in Myers and Read (2010). When eval-
uated on such simulated data, the target adjustment regression of Shyam-Sunder
and Myers (1999) indicates that firms are slowly adjusting to a stationary target.
The regression of Welch (2004) tells us that firms do not actively manage their
capital structure and that the main driver of the market leverage ratio is stock re-
turn. The regression of Flannery and Rangan (2006) implies that the firm adjusts
slowly to a moving target capital structure. However, the pecking order test of
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) rejects the pecking order theory.
Therefore, great care must be taken to account for the presence of growth
options in the design of capital structure tests. More generally, the literature needs
to better consider the power of capital structure tests before drawing conclusions.
2 Related Literature
The three papers explored in this section are quite relevant to this paper. Tser-
lukevich (2008) makes a model of capital structure which accounts for growth
options, but in a less pronounced way than we do, and use some of the capital
structure tests that we apply to our simulated data. Barclay et al. (2006) form a
model in which growth options can force a firm to issue less total debt. Myers and
Read (2010) explores the model we will use for our simulations, and shows static
capital structure changes which we will incorporate into a dynamic setting.
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2.1 Myers and Read (2010)
Myers and Read (2010) introduce a framework for determining the capital struc-
ture of a firm that has assets in place and real options. We will use such an environ-
ment throughout this paper. They find that when a firm has any growth options, it
will be operating below its target leverage. Most of the time, when the value of the
assets in place increase, the negative debt capacity, which will be defined in Sec-
tion 4, from the real option overcomes the positive debt from the increased value
of the asset in place, leading to a lower debt to book ratio, as well as a lower debt
to market ratio. This paper explores what additional insights can be gleaned when
we extend this framework to a dynamic setting with respect to capital structure
tests.
2.2 Tserlukevich (2008)
Tserlukevich (2008) creates a model in which firms have an assets in place Kt
which produce output XtKo for Xt a geometric Brownian motion with drift P.
The tax rates are set with a kink at zero income. There are no adjustment costs.
Hence, the debt level is set so that the firm always pays exactly its income as
interest to debt. If the firm were to have no growth options, then it would have
a constant proportion debt and equity. In fact, if p = 0, then it would have no
equity.
He includes irreversible investment. Growth options to expand capacity from
KO to K 1 cost P(K 1 - KO) + FKo. When the firm experiences good shocks,
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initially the leverage ratio will decrease as the options in the denominator will
increase. Then the option will be exercised and the firm will generate higher
cash flow and thus have a higher leverage. The initial effect is strong enough to
generate the negative relation between leverage and profitability observed in Rajan
and Zingales (1995). (See Section 3.2.) However, the ratio of debt to market value
of assets in place does not change in Tserlukevich's model, as it does in the model
proposed in Section 6. The regression in Welch (2004) (See Section 3.3) is also
run. However, the coefficient on Welch's key variable, the implied debt ratio
(IDR), is very small (less than 0.08), as the increase in the option value does not
affect the optimal change in debt, as it does in our model.
2.3 Barclay et al. (2006)
Barclay et al. (2006) create a 2-period, three date model to show that an increase
in a firm's options cause the firm to have a lower debt level. Assume a zero interest
rate. At date t=0, the firm gets funding from shareholders and bondholders. At
date t = 1, the project returns X distributed uniformly on [a, b], a > 0. Cash
flows from the initial project can be reinvested at t = 1 in a project with cash flow
H > 1 for investment up to a threshold *, and L < 1 for investment above J*. In
this setting, I* is the amount of growth options of the firm. The empire-building
manager will invest all free cash flows at t = 1 into such an investment.
So on the one hand, if X is high, the firm would like to increase debt, so that
the manager does not invest above I*. On the other hand, the manager would like
to have less debt and more free cash flow if X is large. Letting D*(J*) denote the
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optimal debt level yields
D*(I*) =max b -I*H- ,0). (2.1)1 - L
So as * increases, the debt level of the firm will decrease.
This paper differs from our model in that it does not account for the dynamic
nature of real options. Furthermore, as I* tends to zero, the manager will use all
debt, as all projects at t = 1 will have a negative NPV. In our model, we the value
of growth options tend to zero, the manager will choose proportion, A < 1, of the
firm value to be debt.
The three papers explored in this section are quite relevant to this paper. Tser-
lukevich (2008) makes a model of capital structure which accounts for growth
options, but in a less pronounced way than we do, and use some of the capital
structure tests that we apply to our simulated data. Barclay et al. (2006) form a
model in which growth options can force a firm to issue less total debt. Myers and
Read (2010) explores the model we will use for our simulations, and shows static
capital structure changes which we will incorporate into a dynamic setting.
Tserlukevich (2008) models capital structure with growth options and applies
capital structure tests, but has more drawbacks than our model. Barclay et al.
(2006) introduce a setting wherein more growth options makes a firm borrow less.
Myers and Read (2010) form the basis of our model.
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3 Capital Structure Tests
The following four well-known papers incorporate the prevailing capital structure
tests in the literature. For a survey of such tests, see Graham and Leary (2011)
and Frank and Goyal (2008). We will use these papers to shed light on the pitfalls
of not accounting for real growth options in tests, and how this can lead to false
conclusions.
3.1 Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) provide two tests of capital structure. The peck-
ing order theory states that firms issue and retire debt first, then issue or retire debt
as a last resort, because of information asymmetry issues (see Myers and Majluf
(1984)). The first is a pecking order test given in Equation 3.1.
ADit = a + bpoDEFti + e1, (3.1)
where DEFt is the funds flow deficit, and the variables Di, DEFat are scaled by
book value at t - 1. So if the pecking order model is correct, then one expects
a = 0, bpo = 1.
In a target adjustment model, firms have a target capital structure. But they
may not adjust fully in a given period. Rather, they only adjust part of the way to
the target. The target adjustment test is given in Equation 3.2.
ADt = a + bTA(D* - Dit_1) + eut, (3.2)
I I
where D* is the firm's target debt ratio. The variables Dit*, Di,t are scaled by
book value at t - 1. If the target adjustment model is correct, then we expect
bTA > 0.
Shyam-Sunder and Myers look not only at the size of the tests, but also their
power. For the pecking order test, firms retire debt with all of their surplus and if
there is a deficit, they issue debt to cover the whole deficit. For tests of the power
of the target adjustment model, they set the target to be the mean debt book ratio,
choose bTA = 0.4, and standard deviation of error term 0.1.
Shyam-Sunder and Myers consider 157 Compustat firms from 1971-1989 with
all relevant variables recorded for each year. They find that both tests perform
well on the empirical data. However, they find that the pecking order test can
be rejected when the data is generated by the target adjustment model, whereas
the target adjustment model cannot be rejected when the data is really generated
through the pecking order model. Therefore the pecking order test is more pow-
erful, and suggests a greater confidence in this model than the target adjustment
model. This implication underscores the importance of determining the power of
capital structure tests in many settings, as we do in this paper.
3.2 Rajan and Zingales (1995)
Rajan and Zingales (1995) use data from the United States, Japan, Germany,
France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Canada over the period 1987-1991. They
analyze how firms' size, market to book ratio, tangibility (fixed assets to total
assets), and profitability relate to its capital structure. They analyze whether the
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financing patterns using data from American companies also hold for the interna-
tional data. Furthermore, they explore differences among countries in bankruptcy
law and tax rates.
Rajan and Zingales (1995) run the regression in Equation 3.3 augmented with
tangability (ratio of fixed assets to total assets) and log(sales), which do not fall
under our framework. Such variables are now the standard list of cross-sectional
variables.
Leverage[Firmi| = a + 02MarkettoBookRatioi (3.3)
+ /3Profitabilityi + ei,
where the various variables are 4 year averages. They use both book leverage and
market leverage.
Rajan and Zingales get a negative relation between leverage and market to
book. They account for this by suggesting a market timing theory. Also they
conjecture that firms with higher market to book can have higher costs of distress.
Rajan and Zingales also find a negative coefficient on profitability. They argue
for a pecking order framework to explain this phenomenon. If debt is the main
form of short run financing, then the more profitable the firm is, the more debt
it will pay off. Hence the lower the book leverage ratio as well as the market
leverage ratio.
This argument is used in the literature to reject the tradeoff theory, as more
profitable firms generate more profits with fixed assets and thus can more easily
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repay a given proportion of firm value debt. This effect yields lower bankruptcy
costs. Thus, these firms should have higher leverage.
3.3 Welch (2004)
Welch (2004) argues that managers are slow to change capital structure towards a
target and thus the main driver of capital structure is equity returns. Defining
IDR,t+k = , (3.4)
Et (1+ xt,t+k) + Dt
where X,t+k is the equity return between period t and period t + k. IDRt.t+k is
then the leverage ratio if the firm were to do no issuing or repurchase activity to
affect its capital structure.
Welch (2004) then runs the regressions:
MILRtk = a o - a1 ALRtt+k + a 2IDRt. (3.5)
ai = 1, a2 = 0 means that the manager perfectly adjusts to the target. ai -
0, aZ2 = 1 means that the manager does not adjust at all.
He also runs a regression on the change in debt ratios:
AML RI+k -- ao + a1(IDRt,t+k - M LRt). (3.6)
He gets a 1 close to I in both settings, implying a great deal of manager inertia.
Welch uses all firms on Compustat from 1962-2000 with initial equity equal to the
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S &P level at that year multiplied by $1 million. In 1964, the S&P was at 75. So
minimum market capitalization of a firm entering the sample in year 1964 would
be $75 million.
He interprets the results in three ways. First, he conjectures Dynamic Optima
in which the target moves one for one with stock returns. This could be caused
by changes in the discount rate or far-away growth opportunities. Second, Di-
rect Transaction Costs can lead to the manager having a flat objective function,
and path dependence. However, direct transaction costs are small. Third, Welch
appeals to Indirect Costs including the pecking order theory, where the manager
does not want to issue equity with bad price movements because of the signal it
will send to investors, limited memory retention, agency problems, managers sub-
jective valuation of their stock, preference of equity over debt on stock increases
so that managers are harder to remove, and irrational managerial behavior. Fur-
thermore, on the upside and downside different effects could be in play.
3.4 Flannery and Rangan (2006)
Flannery and Rangan (2006) test the target adjustment capital structure model,
realizing that a firm's target can change over time due to firm characteristics. They
use all firms on Compustat, excluding financials and utlitities, from 1965-2001
with data for at least two consecutive years of data. Flannery and Rangan find
that the firm adjusts by over 30% annually, rather than 10% in prior studies. In
particular, they run a target adjustment model with a moving target MDR* =
#Xt, for X firm characteristics: earnings before interest and taxes to tangible
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assets, market to book, depreciation to total assets, log(total assets), fixed assets
to total assets, research and development to total assets, and the firm's industry
mean lagged debt to book ratio. The regression is given in Equation 3.7.
MDRi,t±i - MDRit = A(MDR ,t 1 - MDRij) + eit1. (3.7)
Flannery and Rangan conclude that a partial adjustment model suits the data
well. The targets do indeed depend on well-known firm characteristics X. When
firms are differ from their target, they are quick to go back to their target. Short
run deviations from target in the leverage ratio due to stock price changes correct
in a few years.
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Welch (2004),
and Flannery and Rangan (2006) are representative of the capital structure test-
ing literature. Hence, we will apply these tests to the data generated from our
simulations.
4 Formulation of Model
The model is formulated from that of Myers and Read (2010). It extends in a
natural, continuous way the tradeoff theory to account for real options, as it takes
into account the implied leverage from the options. So if a firm really follows a
tradeoff theory with no growth options, we should expect that firm to follow this
framework when it has growth options.
The firm has a tax rate r. It can borrow and lend at a rate of r per period. Since
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interest payments are tax deductible, for each extra dollar of debt the firm issues,
it gets rr in tax breaks. So the borrowing rate it considers is r(1 - T).
The market price of one unit of asset is S(t), which follows a Brownian mo-
tion process with drift -jU 2 and volatility -. One unit of asset in place pays a
continuous dividend of yS(t). The firm will pay out all earnings to shareholders
at each time. The firm does not hold cash. The firm has K(t) assets in place at
time t. Assets depreciate at a rate of 6 per period. So the process for assets in
place is
dK(t) = -og(1 - 6)K(t) + OpExed(t), (4.1)
where OpExed(t) is number of assets in place obtained through the exercise of
options at time t.
If the firm were to only have assets in place, then it would choose
Debt(t) = AK(t)S(t), (4.2)
Equity(t) = (1 - A)K(t)S(t), (4.3)
thus following the classical tradeoff theory. If the firm were to have an asset which
follows a locally deterministic process, it would finance it exclusively through
debt.
Thus, when the firm has n call options with strikes Aj, expiration dates Ti,
and size of sizej, it will have Synthetic Assets (SynK(t)) and Synthetic Debt
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(SynDebt(t)) from the real options given by the following formulas:
n
SynK(t) = sizeib(di,1) ((1 - 6)(1 + y))T (4.4)
n
SynDebt(t) = sizej b(dj,2)(1 + r(1 - T))-TiAi,
where <b(.) is the cumulative distribution function for the unit normal distribution
and di,, d2,i are given by
log(') + log(1 + r(1 -r)) - log ((I + y)(1 - 6)) + u2 T
di,1 = (i124.5)
-TT
2
di,2 = di,1 - -i
SynK(t) and SynDebt(t) are thus the number of units of asset in place and
amount of debt that one would need to replicate the payoff from time t to t + dt
of the firm's portfolio of options.
Then considering the total replicating portfolio and SynK(t), SynDebt(t) as
analogous to assets in place and debt, respectively, the firm will pick its Debt(t)
and Equity(t) according to
Debt(t) = A(SynK(t) + K(t))S(t) - SynDebt(t) (4.6)
Equity(t) = (1 - A)(SynK(t) + K(t))S(t) (4.7)
The approach here is based on Myers and Read (2010). It differs from standard
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modeling assumptions in that it does not have any adjustment cost of changing
capital structure and it treats options the same way as capital stock. So if a firm
really were to follow a tradeoff theory, it would follow this technique when it has
options.
5 Example
We present the following simple example to demonstrate how exactly relevant
variables including debt to market and debt to book ratios can change when the
firm has growth options with respect to time, the strike of the growth option and
time to maturity. The behavior is somewhat complex and debt to market is cer-
tainly not constant.
Consider the case where S(1) = 1, K(l) = 3, o = .18, 6 = .03. The firm has
one growth option, with size = 1, maturity T = 7. Then if no change in S occurs
(S(t) = 1), we get the following capital structure dynamics for A = 0.90, 1.10 .
Figures 5.1 - 5.5 give the results for A = 0.9. As time approaches the exercise
time, the effect of an increase in option value due to not losing as much divi-
dend yield outweighs the loss in time premium. Then for smaller time, the loss
of optionality outweighs the loss in dividend yield of the option. The synthetic
assets and the synthetic debt increase, as the option is more leveraged closer to
expiration. Due to the synthetic debt of the option, the real debt decreases. Con-
sequently, the debt to market ratio also decreases.
Figure 5.6 - 5.10 give the results for A = 1.10. As time approaches the ex-
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Figure 5.1: Value of the option for K(O) 3, A = 0.90, o= .18, S(t) 1, T =
7, A = 0.50 against time
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Figure 5.2: Synthetic assets for K(O) 3, A = 0.90,o .18, S(t) = 1,T =
7, A = 0.50 against time
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Figure 5.3: Synthetic debt for K(O) 3, A = 0.90,o .18, S(t) 1, T
7, A = 0.50 against time
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Figure 5.4: Debt for K(O) 3, A = 0.90,o .18, S(t) = 1, T 7, A = 0.50
against time
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Figure 5.5:
7, A = 0.50
ercise time, first the option price increases, since the firm is losing less dividend
yield, then the option price decreases due to being out of the money and a loss
in time premium. The synthetic assets and synthetic debt from the options first
increase as the option gets more levered closer to maturity, then decrease, as the
option is out of the money and thus the leverage of the option decreases. Due to
this effect and depreciation, the debt decreases. Consequently, the debt to market
first decreases, then increases, as the synthetic debt of the option decreases close
to expiration.
Figure 5.11 - 5.15 give the case for A = 0.50, K(0) = 3, A = 1, -= .30, T
2, where S varies between 0.30 and 3.00 changes. As S increases, the option
value increases, and the synthetic assets in place increase. The synthetic debt also
increases, and asymptotes to 1, as when the option is far in the money, it behaves
like the levered asset. The debt increases monotonically. Note that for S above
2, the option acts like the asset in place, leading to a larger slope of increase for
the debt. Finally, the debt to market ratio initially decreases as the negative debt
capacity of the option starts to appear. However, for larger S, the synthetic assets
add more debt which counteracts that effect, leading to an increase in debt to
market.
We found that debt to market and debt to book can fluctuate wildly when a
firm has growth options, as we alter the maturity of the option, the value of a unit
of asset in place, S(t), and the strike price of the option. Certainly, these effects
should be considered in any capital structure test.
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Figure 5.6: Value of the option for K(O) 3, A 1.10, o= .18, S(t) 1, T
7, A = 0.50 against time
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Figure 5.7: Synthetic assets for K(0) = 3, A = 1.10,o .18, S(t) = 1, T -
7, A = 0.50 against time
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Figure 5.8: Synthetic debt for K(O) 3, A = 1.10, = .18, S(t) = 1,T =
7, A = 0.50 against time
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Figure 5.9: Debtfor K(0) 3,A = 1.10,o = .18,S(t) = 1,T 7, A 0.50
against time
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Figure 5.10: Debt to market for K(0) 3, A 1.10,o .18, S(t) 1,T =
7, A = 0.50 against time
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Figure 5.12: Synthetic assets in Place for K(O) = 3, A = 0.90,o = .18,T =
2, A = 0.50 against S
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Figure 5.14: Debt for K(O) 3, A 0.90, o .18, T 2, A = 0.50 against S
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against S
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6 Generating Sample of Firms and Capital Struc-
ture
We set the parameters of our model to so that the samples will be drawn from a
reasonable stationary distribution.
At t=l, we start with N = 100 firms. The Brownian motion of the assets in
place of firm i, Si(t), follows a geometric Brownian motion
dS (t) 1 2 (6d1)= 0 2 + o-dZ.(6.1)
Ki(1) = 8. We set a = .15. Each firm gets growth options with size = 1, strike
A = 0.90 which expire at every period in the future. Note that the firm cannot
exercise the option in the current period. We let the capital structure evolve over
time, and keep the target A = 0.5.
At each period, with probability plevee = .07 each firm leaves the sample.
This could happen, for example, if a firm gets acquired by some un-modeled out
of sample firm. The same period t in which a firm leaves, a new firm enters having
the initial K""(t) = 8. Sie"(t) = 1 follows the same underlying process. The
strike price of the new firm's options arriving each period remains A = 1.10 and
the new firm can leave the sample with probability plcave = .07 each period, being
replaced by a yet newer firm, etc. In this way, we get to a stationary distribution.
If we were to have looked at firms which remain in the sample indefinitely, then
S -- oc for some firms, leading the firms to have a limited negative real debt
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capacity, and the options acting as assets in place, and other firms would have
S -+ 0, leading them to be cash cows. The interesting behavior is for interme-
diate values of S. We run the sample 80 years, and figure by this time, we have
reached the stationary distribution. The probability that an initial firm will still be
in the sample at this point is (1 - .07)80 = 0.003. We then run the sample for an
additional 120 years.
We remove sample points that did very well, and have Market to Book Ratio
above 4, since this removes only about 2% of our sample points, and it is some-
what unreasonable for a firm in real life being considered for capital structure
tests to have such a large market to book ratio. The reasoning behind this is that
these firms have had such a great shock to S that the options are so far in the the
money that the negative debt capacity of the option is essentially the strike price
and the firm will just treat the option like assets in place. Furthermore, since S
is so large for these firms, the shock of S for these firms will make a large effect
on the cross sectional distribution of the market to book and debt to book ratios,
as well as on the various regressions. Such regressions will weight more highly
these firms as such firms will have a larger change in the relevant variables. We
will also give robustness checks in subsections for the regressions where we do
not remove these firms, and also where we remove the top and bottom decile of
market to book ratio.
Our simulations have the firm adjusting perfectly to the target at integral times,
but not at all adjusting between periods. There are no retained earnings in our
framework, so a firm will distribute any excess cash and issue debt and equity
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Figure 6.1: Market to book ratio for years 81 to 1 10
when it encounters a shortfall.
Figures 6.1 gives the distribution of the market to book ratio. The spike close
to I occurs because all firms start identically there. The distribution is positively
skewed, as the up side is unlimited, whereas the down side is limited.
Figures 6.2 gives the distribution of the debt to book ratio. The distribution is
positively skewed, as when S increases, the debt tends to first increase. The spike
is caused by all firms starting identically.
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Figure 6.2: Debt to book ratio for years 81 to 110
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Figure 6.3: Debt to market ratio for years 81 to 1 10
Figure 6.3 gives the distribution of the debt to market ratio. There are two
spikes. The spike around 0.5 is because firms which have done very poorly (low
S) essentially lost their growth options and act like cash cows. The lower spike
is because all firms start identically there. The debt to market being very low is
caused by the firms which have done well enough to have a substantial synthetic
debt from the growth options.
Table 6.1 gives the various summary statistics of these distributions.
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Market to Book
1.2239
1.0948
0.6333
Debt to Book
0.4191
0.3773
0.1914
Debt to Market
0.3650
0.3538
0.0694
Table 6.1: Summary statistics of the distributions of market to book ratio, debt to
book ratio, and debt to market ratio for the years 81-110.
Market to Book
1.1530
1.0625
0.6388
IDebt to Book0.4020
0.3702
0.1991
I
Debt to Market
0.3738
0.3661
0.0751
Table 6.2: Summary statistics of the distributions of market to book ratio, debt to
book ratio, and debt to market ratio for the years 171-110.
As for the stability of the distribution, we calculate the distributions for both
the sample years 171-200 (see Figure 6.4 - 6.6 and Table 6.2) and for the entire
sample 81-200 (see Figure 6.7 - 6.9 and Table 6.3). The distributions are similar.
Market to Book
1.1925
1.0948
0.6402
Debt to Book
0.4123
0.3754
0.1997
Debt to Market
0.3693
0.3581
0.0727
Table 6.3: Summary statistics of the distributions of market to book ratio, debt to
book ratio, and debt to market ratio for the years 81-200.
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Figure 6.4: Market to book ratio for the period 171-200
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Figure 6.5: Debt to book ratio for the period 171-200
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Figure 6.6: Debt to market ratio for the period 171-200
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Figure 6.7: Market to book ratio for the period 81-200
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Figure 6.9: Debt to market ratio for the period 81-200
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6.1 How different variables depend on the aggregate shocks
To check the robustness of our distributions, we add a market factor into the mar-
ket price of a firm's asset, as in Equation 6.2 . cr, CA denote the idiosyncratic and
aggregate volatility, respectively. Zt is the Brownian motion specific to firm i. Zt4
is the aggregate Brownian motion.
dS (t) 1 2 2
+ odZ(6.2)
Si(t) 2
We again use N = 100 firms. We choose or, = .15, OrA = .1 so that uotat, =
(o2 + #2 ~ .18. The other parameters remain the same (A = 0.9, A =
0.5, pleave = .07).
We ran the sample for not only 200 years, but rather 4000 years, and looked
at the last 3920 years. We took the cross-sectional means and standard deviations
of market to book, debt to market, and debt to book on year t versus the aggre-
gate shock ZA - Zti1 and a constant term. The coefficients were insignificant or
marginally significant. The results for the means and standard deviations are sum-
marized in Tables 6.4 and 6.5, respectively. There are two competing effects. The
first is that the market value increases and the debt should decrease because of the
negative debt capacity of the option. The second is that the book value increases
as more firms are above the 1.10 threshold to exercise their option.
Thus the presence of an aggregate market factor should not affect our results.
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coefficient std dev T statistic
Market to Book -0.0898 0.0353 2.54
Debt to Market 0.00756 0.0030 2.52
Debt to Book -0.0261 0.0104 -2.5
Table 6.4: Regressions of means of distributions on aggregate shock
coefficient std dev T statistic
Market to Book -0.0407 0.0145 -2.8069
Debt to Market 0.00043 0.0010 0.43
Debt to Book -0.0142 0.0059 2.4068
Table 6.5: Regressions of standard deviations of distributions on aggregate shock
6.2 Constant Volatility of equity, and volatility for simulations
Notice that Equity = (1 - A)(K(t) + SynK(t), and so equity is an asset in
place leveraged to the same amount each instant. Thus, the volatility of equity re-
turns constant and given by A. We see what the volatility of the firm returns in
our simulations discrete time approximations is, and on what variables its depar-
ture from constancy depends. We used logarithmic returns, and got .2942 for the
volatility of equity returns and 0.1207 for the mean return. Tracking the mean and
volatility of equity returns based on market to book, debt to market, and debt to
book ratios yields no significant variation. Hence, the discrete time approximation
used in our simulations should not affect the results.
This generates the prediction that firms with the same volatility of assets in
place should have the same volatility of stock returns. One could consider earn-
ings to book as a proxy for the return of assets in place, compute its volatility
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for many firms, then see if firms with similar earnings volatility indeed do have
similar stock return volatility. This is an area for future research.
6.3 Effect of Time on Firm Characteristics
We should expect the distribution of firm characteristics to depend on their age.
Older firms should have exercised more of their growth options, and have more
dispersed size based on how well they have done. We take the distributions for
years 2-200 of firm book value, debt level, and market value. See Figures 6.10 -
6.12. Since we are only looking at time series properties, using the earlier years
only gives us more sample points, and does not bias the results. Firms tend to
exercise more options to get more assets. Thus, book value, debt, and firm value
tend to increase with age. Also, since Si disperses with time, the variation in these
variables should also increase with firm age.
In Figures 6.13 - 6.15, we present the means and standard deviations of market
to book, debt to book, and debt to market of firms of a given age plotted against
their age. The means and standard deviations are taken over firm years from years
2-200, where the firm is the particular age in question. As some firms do very
well and market value of assets tends to increase, the debt level of these assets
will also tend to increase. The book value does not take the increase in Si(t)
into account, the market to book ratio increases with firm age. Similarly, the
market to book ratio tends to increase with firm age. The debt to market ratio
will increase, as when a firm exercises options with time, it will have more assets
in place compared to its growth options. Hence, the more assets in place will
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Figure 6.10: Debt mean and standard deviation vs firm age
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Figure 6.11: Book mean and standard deviation vs firm age
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Figure 6.12: Market mean and standard deviation vs firm age
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15
yield a higher debt compared to market value. Again, since Si(t) becomes more
dispersed with time, all of these variables will tend to be more dispersed as well.
6.4 Alternate Ways to Remove Firms from Sample
In this section, we consider two alternative methods to remove firms from the
sample: remove the upper and lower decile of firms according to their market to
book ratio, and remove no firms from the sample. We present the distributions
and summary statistics to set up for the regressions on these datasets in sections
7.1.1, 7.2.1, and 7.4.1.
We remove the upper and lower deciles of firm years according to their market
to book ratio. See Figures 6.16, 6.17, 6.18 and Table 6.6. The mean market to
book decreases, as we remove more firms that have done well and have a high
market to book. The firms with low market to book, which we also remove, do
not sufficiently counterbalance this effect, as the market to book of the good firms
which we additionally remove is above double the mean market to book, whereas
the market to book of the poorly performing firms is bounded below by zero. The
mean debt to book ratio decreases, as firm with very low S(t), and thus low debt
and high book value, as book value is a historical measure, are removed from the
sample. The mean debt to market decreases, as poorly performing firms with low
S(t) that have high debt to market closer to A = .5 are removed from the sample.
The standard deviations of all variables decrease, as we remove more extreme
points.
We also consider the uncut distribution. See Figures 6.19, 6.20, 6.21 and Table
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Figure 6.14: Market to book mean and standard deviation vs firm age
56
Age
Mean Debt to Market by firm age
0.38
5 10
Age
15
Standard Deviation Debt to Market by firm age
5 10
Age
15
Figure 6.15: Debt to market mean and standard deviation vs firm age
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Figure 6.16: Removing upper and lower decile, market
to 110
to book ratio for years 81
Market to Book Debt to Book Debt to Market
mean 1.1548 0.3921 0.3542
median 1.0948 0.3775 0.3481
std. dev. 0.3553 0.0809 0.0605
Table 6.6: Removing upper and lower decile of market to book, summary statistics
of the distributions of market to book ratio, debt to book ratio, and debt to market
ratio for the years 81-110.
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Figure 6.18: Removing upper and lower decile, debt to market ratio for years 81
to 110
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Figure 6.19: Market to book ratio for years 81 to 110 for entire distribution
6.7. The debt to book ratio gets above 4. The market to book surpasses 9 for some
firms. The mean market to book ratio increases, as more firms with extremely high
market to book are included. The debt to book ratio decreases somewhat as very
successful firms have more much more debt, but not a commensurate increase with
book value. The debt to market ratio increases slightly. The standard deviations
of the market to book and debt to book ratios increase by at least 30%.
The points with extremely high market to book ratios have had extremely good
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Figure 6.20: Debt to book ratio for years 81 to 110 for entire distribution
Market to Book Debt to Book Debt to Market
mean 1.2860 0.4458 0.3655
median 1.0948 0.3775 0.3550
std. dev. 0.8640 0.3207 0.0692
Table 6.7: Summary statistics of the distributions of market to book ratio, debt to
book ratio, and debt to market ratio for the years 81-1 10 for entire distribution
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Figure 6.21: Debt to market ratio for years 81 to 110 for entire distribution
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Dt - Dt_1 Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
D* - Dti- .1126152 .0106321 10.59
constant .01321 .0016655 7.93
Table 7.1: Target adjustment regression from Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)
for the years 81-110.
shocks. Thus, the relevant variables are high. The nonlinearity means that firms
which do extremely poorly do not make up for this effect when computing means.
Hence, removing the upper and lower deciles of market to book decreases the
means of the relevant variables as well as their standard deviation. Removing
no points increases the means as well as the standard deviations of the relevant
variables.
7 Results of Regressions
7.1 Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)
First, we perform the regressions in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). We exclude
a firm from our regression if it has a market to book ratio above 4 for any time in
our sample. The mean D* is taken firm by firm. The results of the target adjust-
ment model are presented in Table 7.1. We get a significant target adjustment of
11% per year.
The results of the pecking order regression are presented in Table 7.2. The
coefficient on DEF is significantly negative, so a pecking order theory would be
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Dt - Dt- 1 Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
Def -.2185475 .0280261 -7.80
constant -.0062895 .0031921 -1.97
Table 7.2: Pecking order regression from Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) for the
years 81-110.
Dt - Dt_1 Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
D* - Dt_1  .0837563 .0130299 6.43
constant .0147779 .0018009 8.21
Table 7.3: Upper and lower decile removed, target adjustment regression from
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) for the years 81-110.
rejected. The reasoning is that if the firm has a lower deficit, it is more profitable.
Hence, it has a higher S(t). So the assets in place are more valuable. Hence, the
manager will issue more debt against these assets, as the firm's manager follows
a tradeoff theory.
7.1.1 Alternative Firm Removal Techniques
We first remove the firms with at least one point in the sample period in the upper
decile or lower decile of the market to book ratio.
The results of the target adjustment model are given in 7.3. The speed of
adjustment decreases, although it remains significant.
The results of the pecking order model are given in Table 7.4. The pecking
order model is soundly rejected.
We also consider removing no points from the sample.
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Dt - Dt_1 Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
Def -.2655904 .0345906 -7.68
constant -.0095417 .0037955 -2.51
Table 7.4: Upper and lower decile removed, pecking order regression from
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) for the years 81-110.
Dt - Dt_1 Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
D* - Dt_1 .0532591 .0093831 5.68
constant .0165301 .0019815 8.34
Table 7.5: Target adjustment regression from Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)
for the years 81-110 for entire sample
The results of the target adjustment model are given in Table 7.5. The speed
of adjustment decreases, although it remains significant.
The results of the pecking order model are given in Table 7.6. The pecking
order model is Soundly Rejected.
7.2 Rajan and Zingales (1995)
Next, we present the results from the Rajan and Zingales (1995) for our simulated
data. We take averages of the debt to market, debt to book, market to book,
and profitability for the years 81-84 for the firms which existed for all of those
Table 7.6: Pecking order regression from Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) for the
years 81- 110 for entire sample
Dt - Dt_1 Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
Def -.2084855 .0257865 -8.09
constant -.0034981 .0032455 -1.08
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years and had market to book at most 4 for all of those years. There are 65 firms
remaining. The negative relation between market leverage and market to book
from Rajan and Zingales (1995) is present (see Figures 7.1). A higher average
market to book ratio means the firm has more real options, and thus a greater
negative debt capacity stemming from them. Also, the negative relation between
market leverage and profitability from Rajan and Zingales (1995) is present (see
Figure 7.2) . A greater value of S(t) increases the EBIDA, but not the book value.
Hence the profitability will also increase. A greater S also means a larger negative
debt capacity, and thus a lower debt to market ratio.
However, when we deal with book leverage, the relations between profitability
and market to book vs book leverage go in the other direction. See Figures 7.3,
and 7.4. Even though a larger market to book or profitability means more growth
options, and thus a more negative debt capacity, it also means that the existing
assets in place are more valuable. The increase in debt capacity from assets in
place outweighs the decrease in debt capacity from the growth options.
When we run the full regression in Table 7.7 as in Rajan and Zingales (1995),
we get insignificant coefficients. This can be explained by a sort of collinearity
problem. Higher S(t) causes both the market to book ratio and the profitability to
increase.
Running the regression on the book debt ratio in Table 7.8 yields a signifi-
cantly positive coefficient on market to book and an insignificant coefficient on
profitability.
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Figure 7.1: Mean market leverage ratio vs mean
81 to 84, MLR = -.0305 MTB + .4194
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market to book by firm for years
MLR Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
ATB -.0375464 .0337424 -1.11
PROF -.4795338 .5459744 -0.88
constant .4716464 .0201462 23.41
Table 7.7: Leverage regressions from Rajan and Zingales (1995)
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Figure 7.2: Mean market leverage ratio vs mean profitability by firm for years 81
to 84, MLR = -.4777PROF + .4294
BLR Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
MTB .212534 .0357568 5.94
PROF 1.437928 .5785691 2.49
constant .022012 .0213489 1.03
Table 7.8: Leverage Regressions from Rajan and Zingales (1995)
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Figure 7.3: Mean book leverage ratio vs mean market to book by firm for years
81 to 84, BLR = .3464863 MTB + 0.01259
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Figure 7.5: Removing upper and lower decile, mean market leverage ratio vs mean
market to book by firm for years 81 to 84
7.2.1 Alternative Firm Removal Techniques
First, we remove all firms with at least one year in either the upper decile or lower
decile of firm year market to book Ratios in the period 81-84. See Figures 7.5 -
7.8. All of the correlations remain in the same direction.
In Table 7.9, the coefficient on profitability becomes positive. However, the
coefficient on market to book becomes significantly negative.
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Figure 7.6: Removing upper and lower
profitability by firm for years 81 to 84
decile, mean market leverage ratio vs mean
MLR Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
ATB -. 177338 .0312135 -5.68
PROF .7125128 .4995371 1.43
constant .4919792 .022719 21.65
Table 7.9: Removing upper and lower decile, leverage regressions from Rajan and
Zingales (1995)
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BLR Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
MTB .105737 .0341343 3.10
PROF 1.658287 .5462813 3.04
constant .1087596 .0240192 4.53
Table 7.10: Removing upper and lower decile, leverage regressions from Rajan
and Zingales (1995)
MLR Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
MTB .0204384 .0349594 0.58
PROF -.7805302 .5987 -1.30
constant .4366357 .0224961 19.41
Table 7.11: Leverage regressions from Rajan and Zingales (1995) for entire sam-
ple
We get the same results for the book to debt ratio regression. See Table 7.10.
Next, we remove no firms in the period 81-84. The correlations remain mostly
unchanged. See Figures 7.9 - 7.12 .
In Table 7.11, we get no significant coefficient on either market leverage ratio
or profitability.
Table 7.12 gives the same positive coefficients of market to book and prof-
itability on the book leverage ratio.
7.3 Welch (2004)
We run the regressions as in Welch (2004). Problems do not occur when we have
large market to book ratios, as in these cases, the market to book ratio will be
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Figure 7.9: Mean market leverage
81 to 84 for entire sample
ratio vs mean market to book by firm for years
BLR Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
MTB .334929 .051594 6.49
PROF .6540453 .8835773 0.74
constant -.038717 .0332004 -1.17
Table 7.12:
pie
Leverage regressions from Rajan and Zingales (1995) for entire sam-
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Figure 7.10: Mean market leverage ratio vs mean profitability by firm for years
81 to 84 for entire sample
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Figure 7.11: Mean book leverage ratio vs mean market to book by firm for years
81 to 84 for entire sample
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MLR - lagMLR Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
IDR - lagMLR .4765789 .0074348 64.10
constant .0129243 .0005067 25.51
Table 7.13: Welch (2004), 1 year lag
M-LR Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
IDR .4801594 .0068923 69.67
lagMLR .3809853 .009465 40.25
constant .0637286 .0023617 26.98
Table 7.14: Welch (2004), 1 year lag
close to the target, A. So we include these values. First, we consider a I period
lag. There is a positive relation between Market leverage ratio and one year lagged
market leverage ratio. (See Figure 7.13.) When S(t) does not change much, the
debt capacity of the options and assets in place is similar. The vertical line around
0.35 is because all new firms start at that leverage ratio initially.
Also, there is a positive relation between the market leverage ratio and the
implied debt ratio(IDR). (See Figure 7.14). A larger S(t + 1) means a greater
return on equity from t to I + 1. It also means a larger negative debt capacity of
the real options. The Market Leverage Ratio appears cut off at .5 because firms
have debt capacity of j on assets in place and the debt capacity of the options, no
matter how far in the money, is at most
The results are given in Tables 7.13 and 7.14.
Next, we consider a 5 period lag. Figures 7.15, 7.16 give the distributions of
market leverage ratio vs lagged market ratio and market leverage ratio vs implied
81
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Figure 7.13: Market leverage ratio vs 1 year lagged market leverage ratio, one
year lag
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Figure 7.14: Market leverage ratio vs 1 year implied market leverage ratio, one
year lag
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Figure 7.15: Market leverage ratio vs 5 year lagged market leverage ratio, one
year lag
debt ratio. The correlations are less strong, as the path of S in five periods is much
more volatile than in one.
The results are given in Tables 7.15 and 7.16,. Again, the coefficients are
smaller, as S(t) can change more over time. However, the coefficients are still
significant.
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Figure 7.16: Market leverage ratio vs 5 year implied market leverage ratio, one
year lag
MLR - lagMLR Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
IDR - lagMLR .3564871 .0100338 35.53
constant .0368426 .0016368 22.51
Table 7.15: Welch (2004), 5 year lag
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MLR Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
IDR .362008 .0073753 49.08
lagMLR .0153742 .0150174 1.02
constant .2663567 .0049291 54.04
Table 7.16: Welch (2004), 5 year lag
7.3.1 Welch (2004) using Mature vs Non-Mature Companies
One can imagine that mature firms act differently than growth companies in terms
of market leverage's reaction to stock returns. Mature value companies will try
more intently to stay on target. To proxy for growing vs mature companies, we
use profitability. We will still use the period 81-110. Firms in the top half of
profitability in the lagged period of the regression in Welch (2004) are considered
mature companies and firms in the bottom half of profitability are considered not
mature. To determine EBITDA, we need firms to exist one period before the
lagged date. So not all firms enter the sample.
The results for the mature firms are given in Figures 7.17 and 7.18. The same
directions of correlations are present. However, in Tables 7.17 and 7.18, we find
a lower coefficient on implied debt ratio than for the entire sample. Additionally,
the coefficient on the lagged market debt ratio increases. This is due to the firms
being closer to the target of A = 0.50. Thus, the market leverage ratio does not
move as much. So the coefficient on of the implied debt ratio should be lesser, as
it has a less intense impact.
The results for the non-mature firms are given in Figures 7.19 and 7.20. The
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Figure 7.17: Mature firms, market leverage ratio vs 1 year lagged market leverage
ratio, one year lag
ALR - lagML R Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
IDR - IagMLR .3797132 .0105135 36.12
constant .0185617 .0006675 27.81
Table 7.17: Mature firms, Welch (2004), 1 year lag
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Figure 7.18: Mature firms, market leverage ratio vs 1 year implied market leverage
ratio, one year lag
MLR Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
IDR .3794034 .0096631 39.26
lagMLR .4357315 .0150402 28.97
constant .0789068 .0038181 20.67
Table 7.18: Mature firms, Welch (2004), 1 year lag
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Figure 7.19: Non-mature firms, market leverage ratio vs I year lagged market
leverage ratio, one year lag
same directions of correlations are present. However, in Tables 7.19 and 7.20, we
have a higher coefficient on implied debt ratio than for the entire sample. The
optimal leverage does change more with these firms' options being closer to the
money or even out of the money.
The results are given in Tables 7.19 and 7.20.
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Figure 7.20: Non-mature firms, market leverage ratio vs 1 year implied market
leverage ratio, one year lag
MLR - lagMLR Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
IDR - lagMLR .5367752 .0096762
constant 55.47 .000674 9.10
Table 7.19: Non-mature firms, Welch (2004), 1 year lag
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MLR Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
IDR .5382209 .0094708 56.83
lagMLR .3887695 .0133593 29.10
constant .0359198 .0038273 9.39
Table 7.20: Non-mature firms, Welch (2004), 1 year lag
7.4 Flannery and Rangan (2006)
Finally, we consider the Flannery and Rangan (2006) test. We remove firm n at
year t if the market to book ratio of firm n at time t - 1 is above 4. We use the
period 81-110. There is a negative relation between the market leverage ratio and
lagged market to book ratio. (See Figure 7.21.) A higher S(t - 1) means a larger
lagged market to book, and also is correlated with a higher S(t). A higher S(t)
means more negative debt from the real options, and thus a lower debt to market
ratio.
Also, we find a negative relation between market leverage and lagged book
value of assets. (See Figure 7.22.) A higher S(t - 1) means that the firm has
exercised more options and thus has a larger book value. Additionally, a higher
S(t - 1) is correlated with a higher S(t). The higher S(t) causes the firm to tend
to have a lower market leverage ratio.
Furthermore, there is negative relation between the market leverage ratio and
profitability. (See Figure 7.23. Again, a higher S(t-1) tends to mean a higher
lagged profitability. It also tends to mean a higher S(t), which tends to mean a
lower debt to market ratio.
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Figure 7.2 1: Market leverage ratio vs lagged market to book, years 8 1-110
92
Plot forOne-Y ear Lagged Log(Asset) vs Mrk et Leverage Ratio, Flannery and Rangan (2006), years 81-110
0.5 -
O.4*[ 06 o,0ccP
0.45-
0.45 - 0 0
0.3500 0 
-
0.3 - 0 o( o O
0
0 0
0.2 -
CE s 000
0.1 -0
0.2 5 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
On e-year Lagge d L og(Asset)
Figure 7.22: Market leverage ratio vs total assets (book value), years 81-1 10
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Figure 7.23: Market leverage ratio vs lagged profitability, years 81-110
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MLRt Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
MLRt_1  .8199852 .0145716 56.27
MTBt_ 1  .0039871 .0029742 1.34
LNTAt_ 1 .0077399 .0026308 2.94
PROFi1 -.1054055 .0476155 -2.21
constant .0549434 .0074134 7.41
Table 7.21: Flannery and Rangan (2006), 1 year lag
The results are given in Tables 7.21 and Equation 7.1. The lagged market
leverage ratio is a very important factor on current leverage. Also the logarithm
of book value and profitability are important. When letting the target vary, we get
nearly twice the level of reversion to the target as in the Shyam-Sunder and Myers
(1999) target adjustment regression.
MLR' 1 - ALR =5.49% + 19.00%(*X - MLR) (7.1)
O*X1 = 2%MTB + 4%LOGASSET - 28.89%PROFITABILITY
(7.2)
7.4.1 Alternate Firm Removal Techniques
We first remove the firms with the highest and lowest decile of lagged market to
book ratio. The relations go similarly. See Figures 7.24, 7.25, and 7.26.
In Table 7.22, we do no gain or lose significance on any of the variables.
Equation 7.3 points out that the speed of adjustment rises slightly.
95
)t for One-Year Lagged Market to Book vs Market Leverage Ratio, Flannery and Rangan (2006), years 8
0.5 _
0.45 |-
0.4
-E
0.35 -
0.3 -
0.25 -
0.2 -
0.15 -
0 0 0
0 0
0 0
0
0.1 1
O. 1 1.5
One-year Lagged Market to Book
2 2.5
Figure 7.24: Upper and lower decile removed, market leverage ratio vs lagged
market to book, years 81-110
MLRt Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
AMLRt_1  .7834251 .028127 27.85
MTBt_1  .0013117 .0062512 0.21
LNTAI 1 .0091407 .0036532 2.50
PROFt_1 -.0119717 .0629754 -0.19
constant .0572824 .0123445 4.64
Table 7.22: Upper and lower decile removed, Flannery and Rangan (2006), 1 year
lag
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Figure 7.25: Upper and lower decile removed, market leverage ratio vs total assets
(book value), years 81-110
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Figure 7.26: Upper and lower decile removed, market leverage ratio vs lagged
profitability, years 81-110
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Figure 7.27: Market leverage ratio vs lagged market to book, years 81-110 for
entire sample
MLR'J - ALR' = 5.73% + 21.66%(B*Xt - MLR) (7.3)
13*X|= 0.60%AITB + 4.22%LOGASSET - 0.05%PROFITABILITY
(7.4)
Next, we consider the results when we do not remove any firms. Figures 7.27,
7.28, and 7.29 point to similar conclusions.
Notice that in Table 7.23, profitability becomes statistically significant and
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Figure 7.28: Market leverage ratio vs total assets (book value), years 81-110 for
entire sample
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Figure 7.29: Market leverage ratio vs lagged profitability, years 81 -110 for entire
sample
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MLRt Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
MLRt_ 1  .8238807 .0122399 67.31
MTBt_1  .0044758 .002418 1.85
LNTAt_1 .0070812 .0023878 2.97
PROF_1 -.0982585 .0436497 -2.25
constant .0536237 .006843 7.84
Table 7.23: Flannery and Rangan (2006), 1 year lag for entire sample
in Equation 7.5 that the speed of adjustment is decreased slightly from 19% to
17.61%.
AILR' - ALR' = 5.36% + 17.61%(#*X - ML R) (7.5)
O*X' = 2.54%ATB + 4.02%LOGASSET - 55.80%PROFITABILITY
(7.6)
8 Target Adjustment Effect on Tests
We see what will happen if a firm does not adjust fully to a target, but rather only
adjusts part of the way. Concretely,
Debt(t) = pDebt(t - 1) + (1 - p)TargetDebt(t). (8.1)
We choose p = 50%. So a firm will adjust half way to its target each period. Note
that the firm's market value and market to book ratios will not be affected by the
change in capital structure in this framework.
Figures 8.1 gives the distribution of the debt to book ratio. The distribution is
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Figure 8.1: Debt to book ratio for years 81 to 110
positively skewed, as when S increases, the debt tends to first increase. The spike
is caused by all firms starting identically.
Figure 8.2 gives the distribution of the debt to market ratio. There is only one
spike. There is no spike around 0.5 since firms do not adjust completely to their
target, and thus can have a debt to market ratio greater than 0.5. The lower spike
is because all firms start identically there. The debt to market being very low is
caused by the firms which have done well enough to have a substantial synthetic
103
Distribution of Debt to Market Ratio of firms from year 81 to year 200350
300 -
250 -
200 -
150 -
100 -
50
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
Figure 8.2: Debt to market ratio for years 81 to 1 10
debt from the growth options.
Table 8.1 gives the various summary statistics of these distributions.
8.1 Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)
First, we perform the regressions in Shyam-Sunders and Myers (1999). We ex-
clude a sample point from our regression if the firm has a market to book ratio
greater than 4 in our sample period. The results of the target adjustment model are
104
Market to Book Debt to Book Debt to Market
mean 1.2239 0.4109 0.3693
median 1.0948 0.3794 0.3531
std. dev. 0.6333 0.1675 0.0948
Table 8.1: Summary statistics of the distributions of market to book ratio, debt to
book ratio, and debt to market ratio for the years 81-110.
Dt - Dt_1  Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
D* - Dt_1  .0561329 0.0077075 7.28
constant .0114749 .0010613 10.81
Table 8.2: Target adjustment regression from Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)
for the years 81-110. Target adjustment model
presented in Table 8.2. While the coefficient is significantly different from 0, it
is also quite small. One would expect the estimated target adjustment coefficient
to be greater, but the method of estimating the mean Debt to Lagged Book Ratio
could be at fault.
The results of the Pecking Order Regression are presented in Table 8.3. The re-
sults are quite similar to the perfect adjustment case. The pecking order is soundly
rejected.
Dt - Dt_1  Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
Def -.3016341 .0154416 -19.53
constant -.0212953 .0019839 -10.73
Table 8.3: Pecking order regression from Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) for the
years 81-110. Target adjustment model
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Figure 8.3: Target adjustment mean market leverage ratio vs mean market to book
by firm for years 80 to 83
8.2 Rajan and Zingales (1995)
Next, we present the results from the Rajan and Zingales (1995) for our simulated
data. We use the same firms as for the perfect adjustment case. The negative rela-
tion between market leverage and market to book as well as the negative relation
between market leverage and profitability from Rajan and Zingales (1995) is still
present .(See Figures 8.3 and 8.4, respectively) . The correlation is not as strong.
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Figure 8.4: Target adjustment mean market leverage ratio vs mean profitability by
firm for years 80 to 83
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Figure 8.5: Target adjustment mean book leverage ratio vs mean market to book
by firm for years 80 to 83
When find that the positive relation between book leverage and market to
book, as well as the positive relation between book leverage and profitability,
remains. (See Figures 8.5, and 8.6, respectively.)
When we run the full regression in Table 8.4 as in Rajan and Zingales (1995),
we again get insignificant coefficients.
Running the regression on the book debt ratio in Table 8.5 yields an insignif-
icantly positive coefficient on market to book and an significantly positive coeffi-
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Figure 8.6: Target adjustment mean book leverage
firm for years 80 to 83
ratio vs mean profitability by
MLR Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
MTB -.1051017 .044731 -2.35
PROF .1378856 .7237781 0.19
constant .498194 .026707 18.65
Table 8.4: Leverage regressions from Rajan and Zingales (1995). Target adjust-
ment model
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BLR Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
MTB .0424712 .0404722 1.05
PROF 3.499786 .6548679 5.34
constant .0106814 .0241643 0.44
Table 8.5: Leverage Regressions from Rajan and Zingales (1995). Target adjust-
ment model
cient on profitability.
One should not expect much of a difference to the Rajan and Zingales (1995)
tests, as the relevant variables are time series averages, and do not react as much
to target adjustment.
8.3 Welch (2004)
First, we consider a I period lag. The relations between market leverage and
lagged Market leverage, and well as market leverage and implied debt ratio remain
positive and the correlations are stronger than the perfect adjustment case. (See
Figures 8.7and 8.8.) The reasoning is that the inertia Welch was discussing is
really in the model. Managers only adjust debt partially to their target, and so the
market leverage ratio is more affected by lagged market leverage and the implied
debt ratio.
The results are given in Tables 8.6 and 8.7. In Table 8.7, the coefficient for the
implied debt ratio increases substantially from 0.48 to 0.68, as the effect Welch
(2004) proposes is indeed in the data. The coefficient on lagged market leverage
ratio decreases from 0.38 to 0.26, because its effect is being captured by the im-
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Figure 8.7: Market leverage ratio vs 1 year lagged market leverage ratio, one year
lag
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Figure 8.8: Market leverage ratio vs 1 year implied debt ratio, one year lag
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CE
1
I
MLR - lagMLR Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
IDR - lagMLR .9779109 .0685042 14.28
constant .0048914 .0010381 4.71
Table 8.6: Welch (2004), 1 year lag
MLR
IDR
lagMLR
constant"
Coefficient
.6801697
.2627226
.0248976
Standard Error
.1161349
.1021382
.0063911
T Statistic
5.86
2.57
3.90
Table 8.7: Welch (2004), 1 year lag
plied debt ratio term. In Table 8.7, we see a coefficient very similar to that of
Welch (2004) on the real data.
Next, we consider a 5 period lag. The results and comparisons with the perfect
adjustment to target are similar to that of the 1 year lag. Since we are dealing with
five years out, and so S can change a good deal, results in Table 8.8 do not make
that much sense.
MLR - lagMLR Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
IDR - lagAILR 3.388216 .1217928 27.82
constant .0128005 .0019248 6.65
Table 8.8: Welch (2004), 5 year lag, target adjustment
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Market leverage ratio vs 5 year lagged market leverage ratio, one year
MLR Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
IDR .3720042 .1945405 1.91
lagMLR .0483466 .1709881 0.28
constant .2165157 .0107843 20.08
Table 8.9: Welch (2004), 5 year lag, target adjustment
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Figure 8.10: Market leverage ratio vs 5 year implied debt ratio, one year lag
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Figure 8.11: Market leverage ratio vs lagged market to book, years 81-110
8.4 Flannery and Rangan (2006)
Finally, we consider the Flannery and Rangan (2006) tests. We use the same
sample as in the perfect adjustment case. Figures 8.11, 8.12, and 8.13 give similar
results to the case of no target adjustment.
The results are given in Table 8.10 and Equation 8.2. The market to book
ratio becomes significant, but the logarithm of book value becomes insignificant.
The speed of convergence drops from 19% to 17.51 % per year. The speed of
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Figure 8.13: Market leverage ratio vs lagged profitability, years 81-110
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MLRt Coefficient Standard Error T Statistic
MLRt- 1  .8248721 .0163855 50.34
MTBt_1  .0144428 .0045592 3.17
LNTAt_ 1  .0041249 .003715 1.11
PROFt_1  -.2000327 .0689183 -2.90
constant .0582352 .0095065 6.13
Table 8.10: Flannery and Rangan (2006), 1 year lag
convergence should drop as we introduced target adjustment into the model. It is
however surprising that the speed drops by such a small amount.
JLR'o - ALRt = 5.82% + 17.51%(3*Xt - MLR) (8.2)
3*X'= 8%MTB + 2.36%LOGASSET - 114.22%PROFITABILITY
(8.3)
9 Conclusion
We introduced a tradeoff model of capital structure which accounts for the pres-
ence of real options. In reality, options are very important for firms when they
decide their capital structure. We simulate such firms with reasonable parameters
and let them leave the sample some probability so that we can get a stationary
distribution. Then we evaluate what four of the main capital structure tests tell us
the underlying process is when it is really driven by this process.
The pecking order test of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) soundly rejects the
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pecking order theory, as it should because the pecking order is not present in the
data.
Their target adjustment test tells us that firms adjust slowly 10% per year to-
wards a target, whereas in the data they perfectly adjust to a moving target.
The empirical facts of Rajan and Zingales (1995) are confirmed in the simu-
lated data, even though their interpretations do not apply to this data.
Welch (2004) tells us that firms have a great deal of inertia and the main driver
for the market leverage is the implied debt ratio, followed to a much lesser extent
by lagged market leverage ratio. The behavior of sluggish adjustment does not
hold in this data.
Flannery and Rangan (2006) show us that firms move a bit faster than Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999), at 19% per year toward a target, and also that profitabil-
ity is very negatively related to the target. This last point is true in the simulated
data, but firms are really on target each period.
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